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I. Introduction:
Revisiting Actual Malice and Reckless Disregard
at the Enterprise Level

New York Times v. Sullivan1 was decided in 1964 when the media landscape was
markedly different. Only one newspaper company was then publicly traded, and it had “gone
public” the previous year. Today hundreds of newspapers, accounting in the aggregate for 40
percent of daily and half of Sunday circulation, are owned by public companies.2
In a sense, 1964 could be regarded as “the good old days” in that there was much less
concentration of media ownership. Ben Bagdikian chronicled the rapidity of change. His
groundbreaking study, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, reported that in 1983 most of the major media
were concentrated in 50 corporations but that just nine years later the control formerly in the
hands of those 50 dominant companies was wielded by a mere 20 “and the number of
companies controlling most of the national daily circulation” had shrunk from 20 to 11.3 A
single broadcaster, Clear Channel Communications, currently owns 1,200 radio stations, a scale
unthought of in 1964.

1

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964).

2

For historical data and financial information, see G. CRANBERG, R. BEZANSON & J.
SOLOSKI, TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY
(2001).
3

The Media Monopoly, (Fourth Edition) Ben Bagdikian, Beacon Press
2

The combination of consolidation and public ownership has powerfully concentrated the
minds of media managers on maximizing profits. Veteran Washington Post journalists Leonard
Downie Jr. and Robert G. Kaiser described the consequences:

Too much of what has been offered as news in recent years has been
untrustworthy, irresponsible, misleading or incomplete….Most newspapers have
shrunk their reporting staffs, along with the space they devote to news, to increase
their owners’ profits. Most owners and publishers have forced their editors to
focus more on the bottom line….If most newspapers have done poorly, local
television stations have been worse….The national television networks have
trimmed their reporting staffs and closed foreign reporting bureaus to cut their
owners’ costs…Most newspapers, television networks and local television and
radio stations belong to giant, publicly owned corporations far removed from the
communities they serve. They face the unrelenting quarterly profit pressures from
Wall Street now typical of American capitalism. Media owners are accustomed to
profit margins that would be impossible in most traditional industries.4

4

The News About the News, Leonard Downie Jr. and Robert G. Kaiser,
Alfred A. Knopf, 2002.
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Indeed, when newspaper companies opted to go public, they declared in essence that they wanted
to be treated in the marketplace the same as any other enterprise, as they are.5
It has become almost a cliché among journalists to observe that, while the press is a
business, it is a different kind of business because of the informing role it plays in a democratic
society. Increasingly, however, media companies resemble and behave the same as any other
business, the composition of theirs boards of directors indistinguishable from other corporate
boards, their compensation incentives no different from the proverbial manufacturer of widgets.
The CEO of Gannett, the nation’s largest newspaper chain, receives $1,600,000 in salary,
$2,250,000 in bonus, and 400,000 stock options.6 The compensation, which is certainly not out
of the norm for large consolidated media companies, is justified by “company performance,”7
which means shareholder return on investment, return on assets, return on equity, operating cash
flow, operating income, stock price, and market value. Gannett’s operating margins are lauded
as “among the best in the industry.”8 Nowhere in this list is the quality and strength of
journalism practiced in the newsrooms owned by Gannett even mentioned. And as Gannett
applauds its investment performance, the Project for Excellence in Journalism describes, in its
annual report on journalism, “a difficult environment: more pressure on people, less time to

5

G. CRANBERG, R. BEZANSON & J. SOLOSKI, TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE
PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY (2001).
6

Gannett proxy statement 2004
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Id. at

8

Id. at
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report stories....”9 Journalism is contributing to the bottom line of the large companies, not by
improving journalism’s quality, but by sacrificing it.
Since its beginning, the actual malice test first announced in 1964 in New York Times v.
Sullivan,10 has met with criticism from some quarters. The test’s demand that the mind of the
reporter be proved “with convincing clarity”11 has proven difficult, invasive, and so expensive
that often the losers can’t be distinguished from the winners in public libel cases.12 End runs
around the subjective state of mind inquiry by plaintiffs have become more common.13 And the
actual malice test’s predictability, its capacity as a standard of liability to yield consistent and
coherent results across a body of cases, remains a hollow promise. As Robert Sack famously put
it, successful libel plaintiffs “resemble the remnants of an army platoon caught in an enemy
crossfire.”14

9

The State of the News Media 2004: An Annual Report on American Journalism,
<http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org>, Project for Excellence in Journalism (2004).
10

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-286 (1964).

12

R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg & J. Soloski, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY 4-5 (1987).
13

E.g., Mason v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)(comparing implicit or
inferential meaning with text); Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989) (noting circumstantial proof of purposeful avoidance of the truth).
14

Robert Sack, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS xxvi (P.L.I. 1980).
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Perhaps the central flaw in the subjective malice/recklessness test, however, is its
exclusive focus on individual rather than corporate conduct,15 a shortcoming so fundamental that,
in our judgment, the test should be supplemented, in the press setting at least, with what we call
an institutional reckless disregard standard that would be applicable to actions brought not
against the reporter and editor but against the corporation and based on corporate business
decisions made in the face of known risks of falsity. The product-liability-like tort action would
rest on a largely objective assessment of the corporate decisions that affect journalism when they
manifest knowing indifference to the risk of defamatory falsehood that flow from the decisions.16
Why would such a standard be preferable in such cases?
First, the actual malice/reckless disregard standard focuses on the state of mind of a
reporter or editor instead of on the underlying factors that can give rise to defamatory
publication, and over which writers and editors may have little or no control.17 Liability thus is
often divorced from the very decisions and policies at the institutional level that produce,
facilitate or influence the harmful conduct.

15

By this we mean that the actual malice test by definition focuses on the state of mind of
one or more individuals (perhaps a reporter, or an editor) about an identified factual statement
prior to the time of publication, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728 (1968), rather than on the contribution of corporate
policies, generalized procedural judgments, and incentives within an organization, where
knowledge of falsity of a fact before publication would be a meaningless and futile standard. See
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(en banc).
16
17

See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.

See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at
728; R. BEZANSON, ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY (1987).
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Second, the actual malice/reckless disregard standard is blunt-edged. It exacts heavy and
often vengeful damage penalties on news organizations based only on misbehavior by the author
of a defamation.18 It thus exacts a disguised form of strict liability of news organizations for the
behavior of their writers and editors, but with no determination that the news organization was in
any way at fault for the harm. And it exacts misdirected liability on an often huge scale, with
damage verdicts way out of proportion to harm, and explainable only on the ground that the quite
possibly faultless news organization should be deterred from conduct in which it played no
causative role.
Third, while libel actions may be traumatic for journalists, the shift of financial liability
to the business as a whole insulates journalists from responsibility for knowing and false
misbehavior, thus in effect making them more indifferent to the risks their behavior imposes on
others.
Fourth, by exacting punishment based on conduct of journalists, not on organizational
recklessness, the actual malice/recklessness inquiry frees news organizations to adopt risky
practices without fear of consequences. At a time when market-based forces are placing great
financial pressure on newsrooms and the publicly traded organizations that own most of them,19
a rule that frees journalistically dangerous corporate decisions from cost or consequence is likely,
perversely, to facilitate the very choices that the law should discourage. If a central purpose of
tort law is to deter and shape harmful behavior, the malice test does precisely the opposite.

18

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
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For these reasons we propose a different approach to defamation caused by news
organizations, one that rests liability on corporate decisions that are known to present a
heightened risk of falsity and defamation because of the impact of such decisions on staffing,
training, editorial oversight, copyediting and related factors that affect the reliability of the news
product and that cannot be justified on grounds related to the quality or journalistic performance
of the news organization. We believe that decisions that are knowingly, indeed often
calculatedly, taken to increase profits or personal wealth at the cost of slipshod journalism should
not be relieved, as they are now by the actual malice privilege, from consideration in establishing
liability. They should be sheltered by the First Amendment from excessive measures of liability
and extremes of intrusion into editorial processes, but they should not be absolutely protected
from liability as they are today.20
We do not recommend disbanding the existing actual malice standards of knowing or
reckless falsity. Actual malice should remain the constitutional standard in cases challenging the
editorial decisions of individual reporters or editors to publish a false and defamatory story. The
news organization’s liability, however, should be subject to a distinct standard based on proof
that decisions at the institutional level were made knowing that they would produce a
journalistically unjustified heightened riskof false and defamatory publication.

21
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See, e.g., GENE ROBERTS, LEAVING READERS BEHIND (2001); G. CRANBERG, AL.,
TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSAPER COMPANY (2001).
20

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

21 An additional benefit of this approach is that the kinds and measures of damages might be
better and more reasonably allocated, and the winner-take-all quality of punitive damages in libel
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In the pages that follow we will, first, present the evidence upon which our proposal, as a
matter of journalistic practice and public policy, rests, including particularly the changes in the
forms of journalism and the market forces now bearing strongly on the journalistic practices
rewarded in the large and often publicly traded news organizations. These are developments
which, in our judgment, warrant revisiting the actual malice standard with explicit attention to
liability for defamation caused by forces and choices within the organization itself, not just its
reporters and editors. We will then develop the standard of institutional reckless disregard in
greater detail, distinguishing it from reckless disregard of the truth now applied under the
heading of the actual malice privilege. Finally, we will turn to the Constitution, where we will
demonstrate that the institutional recklessness test we propose is not only constitutional under the
First Amendment, but indeed that it is fully consistent with developments in tort law and
constitutional theory over the past 25 years.

II. Enterprise Liability in News Organizations

Falsehoods bedevil journalism. In multiple surveys, the public consistently gives the
press low marks for accuracy. Typical is a 1998 national poll reporting that 86 percent of
respondents believed stories “often” or “sometimes” contained factual errors.22 .The public’s
perception jibes with academic studies that find as many as half or more of newspaper stories

cases might finally be put to rest. R. Bezanson & G. Cranberg, Punitive Damages: Muzzled
Press?, New York Times Op-Ed, June 13, 1988, at 23).
22
Robert J. Haiman, “Best Practices for Newspaper Journalists,” The Freedom Forum,
available at www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13087 (viewed on
April 4, 2004.)
9

contain at least one mistake.23 Newspaper editors confirm that inaccuracy is a major journalistic
problem. By all accounts, little has changed since executive editor David Lawrence of the
Detroit Free Press wrote in 1984:
“After being interviewed many times in the past decade as a newspaper editor,
‘damage control’ is the way I approach the media. I try to talk slowly enough, and ‘quotably’
enough to get my point across and the facts right…. I try to minimize the damage from reporters
who have preconceived notions about the ‘truth’…Sometimes I know I’d be better off being less
accessible to people I know have made up their minds about the story, but that hardly seems right
for someone in the business of asking questions and seeking access. What a shame I feel this
way.”24
Roger Tatarian, then editor of United Press International, had expressed a similar
sentiment two years earlier when he described being jolted by misquotes. “I had spoken from a
written text,” he complained, “I knew exactly what I had said, and I knew exactly what had come
before and after the key quote. And now I saw how it had come out and [I] could have cried. I
began to wonder how often this sort of thing happened, and in talking with editors and
publishers…over the years, I got an uncomfortable answer: Almost of all of them testified, off

23

Scott Maier, “Getting It Right? Not in 59 Percent of Stories,” 23 Newspaper Res. J.
10, (2002); Michael Singletary, Accuracy in News Reporting: A Review of the Research, ANPA
News Research Report No. 25, Jan. 25, 1980.
24

David Lawrence Jr., “From the Harvard Business School, Lessons on Newspaper
Accuracy”, The Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, March 1984, at 7.
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the record, that they too had been left shaken at one time or another at how their remarks had
come out in print.”25
Obviously, the error problem is not news to newspaper executives. Indeed, they have
collectively bemoaned the low state of press credibility, and the American Society of Newspaper
Editors periodically has searched for remedies.26 There is often a disconnect, however, between
the problem decried by editors and the policies adopted by their corporate superiors. Instead of
expenditures to launch a war on error, the latter frequently insist on measures that exacerbate the
problem.
Errors usually are categorized as either objective or subjective. The former includes
purely factual miscues, such as misspelled names or errant addresses. Subjective errors in stories
distort, misrepresent or mislead because, while the facts cited may be true, omissions and
imbalance or emphasis create a false impression.
Errors of both kinds are bound to occur in an enterprise with deadlines that relies on
human beings with all of their foibles and shortcomings. While the sources of error usually can
be pinpointed and responsibility fixed on one or more individuals, journalists do not work in a
vacuum. Often the conditions under which they work are major contributing factors, if not
chiefly responsible for, errant reporting and editing. We believe mistakes due in substantial part
to company policies adopted while knowing they carried a likely risk of induced falsity should
be regarded as “institutional error.”

25

Roger Tatarian, “How Do You Teach Accuracy?,” The Bulletin of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors, Sept. 1982, at 21.
26 See Michael Singletary, Accuracy in News Reporting: A Review of the Research, ANPA
News Research Report No. 25, Jan. 25, 1980.
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An example would be the newsroom downsized to meet profit targets where overburdened staffers must scramble to fill space without sufficient time to verify their work. All
newspapers are labor-intensive; many also are profit-driven. Efforts to improve balance sheets
almost unavoidably affect staffing. Whether managements opt for layoffs, buyouts or trims by
attrition, the net effect of downsizing is to diminish the newsroom’s ability to ride herd on error.
Ironically, the most caring and generous of the measures, the buyout, may be the riskiest because
of the way it encourages departure of the most experienced employees -- the senior staffers with
institutional memory and familiarity with the community that make them especially effective
bulwarks against error.
Newsrooms have lost about 2,200 employees since 1990.27 The observation by veteran
former editor Gene Roberts that, while he has heard of papers with reduced staff that improved,
he’s never seen one, is telling.28 So is the comment by Howard Tyner, former editor of the
Chicago Tribune, about the effect of belt-tightening at his paper: “There’s always a price for
being lean…. I have top people who are terrific, and here and there I have deputies who are
good, but it thins out real fast. And you can see that in the paper. We make more mistakes than
we did before…[The Tribune] would be edited…much better if we had more people there.”29
Washington Post editors Leonard Downie and Robert Kaiser described the critical
importance of adequate staffing in their book, “The News About the News.” They explained:

27

Table A, American Society of Newspaper Editors survey, “Newsroom Employment
Survey.” (2003). Available at www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=1138 (visited April 5, 2004.)
28 Gene Roberts
29
Leonard Downie & Robert Kaiser, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS: AMERICAN
JOURNALISM IN PERIL 84 (2002).
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“Adding employees allows a paper’s ambitions to rise and gives all staff members more time to
do their job more carefully. Management that supports its journalists with resources will bring
out their very best. Managements that cut and squeeze demoralize their people as they
shortchange their readers.”30
The newspaper companies that are publicly traded must be mindful both about the return
to their investors and about the economic performance of their peers. Although few papers face
newspaper competition in the communities where they publish, their parent corporations
compete for investors in the marketplace. Thus, profit margins are watched closely by stock
analysts, and comparisons are made. As Knight Ridder CEO Anthony Ridder ruefully noted,
“…they [the analysts] would be much happier if we had Gannett margins; they’d jump for joy if
we said we had Gannett margins…”31
The upshot is that the most profit-hungry companies, the ones most heedless of the
adverse consequences of cost-cutting on editorial standards, affect not only their own newsrooms
but also newsrooms elsewhere.
The bonuses and stock options at publicly traded newspaper companies, which account
for about 50 percent of daily and Sunday circulation, are heavily weighted toward rewarding the
achievement of financial targets rather than improving quality or circulation. When Geneva
Overholser was editor of the Gannett-owned Des Moines Register in the 1990s, her bonus
objectives included this one established for her by corporate:
“Help the company make budget by staying within extremely tight expense budgets,
30

Id. at 68.
Randall Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg and John Soloski, TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM
AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY 58 (2001).
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conserving newsprint and participating in intracompany efforts to become more efficient. Stay
within budgeted amounts for payroll (eliminating two positions and saving $100,000).”32
That seems almost benign compared to what consultants recommended for the WinstonSalem (NC) Journal, owned by the publicly traded Media General company. The money-saving
formula the consultants devised directed that “a [front-page] story should be six inches or less. A
reporter should use a press release and/or one or two ‘cooperative sources.’ He or she should
take 0.9 hours to do each story and should be able to produce 40 of these in a week”33 The
formula was widely derided, and it was scrapped, but the consultant did succeed in trimming 20
percent of the paper’s 600-person workforce.34
While the Winston-Salem paper’s experience with by-the-numbers-journalism may have
been an aberration, editors nowadays face heavy bottom-line pressure. Downie and Kaiser
described their predicament:

32

Downie and Kaiser, supra note 6, at 94.

33

Id. at 97.

34 Id.

14

“…most of the corporations that own newspapers are focused on profits, not
journalism. Editors who once spent their days working with reporters and editors
on stories now spend more of their time in meetings with the paper’s businessside executives, plotting marketing strategies or cost-cutting campaigns. Chain
editors now routinely have two titles: editor and vice president of a big
corporation.”35

35

Id. at 68.

15

Advertising is the prime source of newspaper revenue.36 It tends to be cyclical, ebbing and
flowing with the economy. Newspapers often reduce staff in response to economic downturns,
but many times do not recoup all of the staff losses during recovery, thereby creating more or
less permanent and heightened risk of institutional error.
The proverbial last line of newsroom defense against error traditionally has been the copy
desk, but at many papers it has become a porous defense. When page make-up formerly done in
composing rooms shifted to newsrooms, the task of electronic composition known as pagination
frequently fell to copy editors, who became primarily paginators (electronic page designers) and
only incidentally, if at all, guardians against error.37 The switch to pagination enabled newspaper
companies to wipe out whole composing rooms, whose employees usually were union members,
while the newsroom employees who replaced them usually were not organized.
Pagination increases the workload. By one estimate, it adds between a shift and five shifts
of staff time daily, depending on the size of the paper. Unless staff is added to compensate for
pagination, copy editing, and thus accuracy, is bound to suffer.38 Flawed heads and error-laden
copy that emerge from copy desks too busy paginating to flag the errors and raise questions
about stories because the companies chose to improve the bottom line rather than add staff are
classic forms of institutional error.
Turnover explains much about what is wrong in newspapers. The managing editor of the
Sarasota Herald-Tribune admitted in a Dec. 24, 2000 column to readers, “For the fourth time in

36 Taking Stock at
37 Id.
38
Bezanson, Cranberg and Soloski, supra note 8, at 53-55.
16

five years, this newspaper is looking for a new Manatee County government reporter.” The
editor related how a school board member complained. “In the four years I’ve been on the board,
we’ve had seven different education writers from the Sarasota Herald-Tribune. By the time one
figured out what was going on, they were gone, and somebody else was in there. We knew what
was going on (with school budget problems). We talked about it, and it did not get reported."39
Turnover limits experience, which is compounded when reporters are inadequately
trained to begin with. As Robert J. Haiman reported in a study for The Freedom Forum,
“Business, community and civic leaders say they and their organizations often are covered by
reporters who simply do not know enough about the subjects they are trying to report on.
Inability to report with authority was cited repeatedly as a problem….” 40
Various sources told Haiman:

39

Rosemary Armao, Editorial, “Herald-Tribune Is Trying Hard To Keep Continuity of
Coverage,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Dec. 24, 2000 at BS3.
40

Haiman, supra note 1, at 23.
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“The reporters just come and go; by the time they learn something about us they
are shifted to another beat.”….”The stories she writes about us are so
oversimplified and distorted we’d rather not have any coverage at all.”….”Surely
there must be one business reporter who majored in economics instead of
English.”…. “The sports reporters seem to be experts about sports; how come the
business reporters aren’t experts about business?”….’Too often, reporters haven’t
bothered to do their homework; they’re unprepared and we’re spending all of our
time getting them up to speed on an issue.”….”I know this stuff can get a little
complicated at times, but if he doesn’t understand it, how can he make it
understandable to readers?”41

Yet papers persistently downsize payroll, and thus encourage turnover, even as they fail to invest
sufficiently in training those who stay. When poorly paid and trained reporters who lack
background in the subjects they cover produce stories riddled with errors, and they are
insufficiently checked by copyeditors and inadequately supervised by overworked editors, that is
a recipe for institutional error, not to mention libel suits. In those suits, it is the hapless reporter
or editor immediately responsible for the damaging error who will be cited in the complaint,
whose work is scrutinized and who will be grilled in depositions. Almost always missing from
this scene are the publishers, CEOs and CFOs who in a real sense determine the quality of

41

Id. at 23-24.
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journalism and who ought to be answerable for it. It is they, after all, whose priorities decided the
size and competence of the staff by the budgets they imposed.
So when a damaging falsehood is published, and the injured party looks to the courts for
redress, it seems to us reasonable for the legal system to address the issue of institutional error.
Among the relevant questions: Who set the final newsroom budget? How much inquiry was
made of its likely impact on accuracy? If staff or payroll was downsized, what assurances were
sought that it would not lead to heightened risk of error? How much was budgeted for training?
What is the staff’s experience level? What has been done to minimize turnover? What editing
procedures are in place to guard against error?
In other words, if you are harmed by a mistake, you should have the right to inquire
whether the mistake was the result of a company policy or decision adopted knowingly or in
reckless disregard of the likelihood of error, and if so, to hold the institution responsible.

III. Institutional Reckless Disregard and the First Amendment

In New York Times v. Sullivan42 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
prohibits public officials from recovering damages for libel in the absence of proving that the
defendant published the libelous statement with actual malice. Actual malice, the Court
thereafter held, means that the publisher knew the libelous statement was false at the time of
publication, or actually entertained serious doubts about the statement’s truth and published

42

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19

recklessly in the face of those doubts.43 Actual malice, in short, requires that a libel plaintiff
prove the publisher’s subjective state of mind in relation to the falsity of a specific and known
statement that would produce known harm to a known person. Without requiring proof of such
fact- and circumstance-specific subjective knowledge, the publisher’s freedom to publish would
not enjoy the breathing space – the margin for error – that the First Amendment requires in order
to preserve a “robust, uninhibited, and wide-open” marketplace of expression.
Over the course of the nearly 40 years since Sullivan was decided, the essential quality of
actual malice has remained unchanged. The inquiry has focused on a known factual statement in
relation to a known person and a known harm.44 Gross irresponsibility or recklessness
unattached to known falsity of a specific statement will not suffice to support liability.45 The
malice standard, therefore, places control over liability for defamation in the hands of the
reporter and editor, whose own state of mind must be established; it does not subject them to
liability pursuant to the less predictable vicissitudes of reasonable journalistic practices or
changing journalistic standards. This feature of the malice rule reflects an assumption that the
institutions of journalism within which reporters and editors operate share certain common and
minimum standards and procedures deserving of respect under the First Amendment and,
therefore, warranting shelter against intrusive judicial inquiry through libel suits.46
Over the 40 years since Sullivan, however, the confidence that was once felt about the
basic qualities of journalistic institutions has been eroded. Profit pressures, financial market

43 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
44 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
45 Id. at
46
Quote from Gertz or Sullivan; CRANBERG, ET AL., supra note 8.; Randall P. Bezanson,
The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 Neb. L. Rev. 754 (1999).
20

incentives, and often dramatic changes in practice and process have made it more difficult to
entertain a baseline confidence in news organizations,47 which are more commonly than not
subsidiaries of large and publicly held companies. Staffing in the newsroom has been
significantly reduced.48 Copyediting departments and functions have been reassigned and
effectively eliminated.49 Editorial layers have been stricken.50 The business side of news
organizations has often merged with the editorial side; the wall of separation has broken down.51
Editors (and occasionally star reporters) are paid in generous measure by incentive compensation
arrangements based on revenues, operating margins, efficiency, and performance of the
company’s stock on the financial markets, not on the quality of the journalism practiced.52
Circulation has been cut or reshaped through socioeconomic shaping and redlining.53
These and other changes in the basic character of the news organization54 have begun to
place significant stress on the application of the actual malice test. In some cases courts’ focus
has begun to shift from what a reporter knew about the falsity of a particular statement about a
particular person, to what the publisher or editor knew about the risks of error.55 The malice
question has also begun to focus on whether the publisher or editor was subjectively aware of
high risks of error that would result systematically from editorial and policy decisions made in
47

ROBERTS, supra note 8; CRANBERG ET AL., supra note 8.
48 Taking Stock, at
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Cranberg, Colum. Journ. Rev. ( ); Bezanson, The Atomization of the Newspape:
Technology, Economics and the Coming Transformation of Editorial Judgments About News, 3
Commun. Law & Policy 175 (1998).
54 See note supra.
21

the newsroom.56 As the Supreme Court explained in the Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v.
Connaughton decision:

55 See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(en banc): Harte-Hanks
Commun., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
56
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(en banc).
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It is ... undisputed that Connaughton [the plaintiff] made the tapes of the Stephens
interview available to the Journal News and that no one at the newspaper took the
time to listen to them. Similarly, there is no question that the Journal News was
aware that Patsy Stevens was a key witness and that they failed to make any effort
to interview her. Accepting the jury’s determination that [the editor’s and
reporter’s] explanations for these omissions were not credible, it is likely that the
newspaper’s inaction was a product of a deliberate decision not to acquire
knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of Thompson’s
charges. Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual
malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category.”57

57 491 U.S. at

.
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The Connaughton decision, in the view of many,58 states a formulation of actual malice that
focuses on subjective state of mind regarding falsity but that rests in part on policies and
behavior that produce risk of harmful error, and not exclusively on known falsity of a fact being
published. It reflects, on the one hand, a continued commitment to the idea that the First
Amendment should protect against liability for publication in the absence of proof of “guilty”
state of mind, yet it reflects as well a new attitude that the process of journalism may not in every
case deserve the strong presumptive respect that was incorporated into the original actual malice
idea. The Connaughton test, in short, represents a first step toward a separation of the reporter’s
liability for falsehood, on the one hand, and an institution’s liability for decisions and policies
that produce high risks of defamatory falsehood, on the other. It places the institutional
recklessness standard that we proposed in clearer relief, making easier its legal definition and
justification, to which we will now turn, and sharpening the constitutional questions it raises, to
which we will thereafter turn.

A. The Meaning of the Recklessness Standard

The institutional reckless disregard question asks whether, at the level of a publisher or in
the higher corporate reaches of a holding company, often a publicly traded company with news
operations as subsidiaries, decisions were made for financial and financial market-based reasons
unrelated to journalism in the face of known risks of falsity that wold result from reduction,
reorganization, or reorientation of the news operations. The question, in other words, is not

58 Critical articles re: Connaughton.
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whether the editors or news staff disagreed or were substantially hampered by the decisions, but
whether those persons animated by the financial and market forces were aware of the
consequences and acted without journalistic justification nonetheless. For purposes of liability,
therefore, the question is not focused on the particular false and defamatory statement that was
published, but on whether the statement was a product of the changed policy or procedure that
caused a heightened risk of falsity, and whether the decision to adopt the policy or procedure was
made knowing of its systematic consequences, and without journalistic justification. The claim
is much like a product liability claim based on knowledge that a defective and dangerous product
is being produced.
While ordinary product liability or strict liability claims could be based on a finding that
a company should have known of the defect, we believe a higher standard of proof should be
required in recognition of the fact that the decisions to be examined, while purely economic and
financial in character, produce consequences for published expression protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, we suggest that the decision makers themselves – the publisher, the
executive(s) responsible in the holding company, for example – must have actually been aware
of the heightened risk of falsity and attendant compromises in the journalistic process and acted
nonetheless without journalistic (as opposed to financial) justification. The inquiry about actual
knowledge of risk and justification will focus not on the reporter or the editor responsible for the
defamatory story, but on the information available to and motives of the corporate decision
maker. The inquiry will be intrusive, but not into the specific newsroom decisions in the course
of reporting the news, as is the case now with the actual malice test.
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Is there a precedent in the law for such a standard and inquiry? As it turns out, the closest
analogy (and an analogy that confirms our assertion that a high standard should be set in the
interest of the First Amendment) is to be found in the law of corporate criminal responsibility.
When can a corporation be found guilty of a crime, and on the basis of what proof of knowledge
and intent, on whose part? Two leading cases on these questions are very instructive – and
indeed yield the conclusion that our proposed standard of actual knowledge by the decision
maker is higher even that the criminal law requires.
In the first case, United States v. Bank of New England,59 the question involved the proof
necessary to establish a bank’s criminal liability for failing to report certain currency transactions
under federal law.60 The federal statute attaches ciminal liability for a bank (as a corporation)
only when the financial institution “willfully” violates the reporting requirements. Willfulness
“must be suppported by ‘proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the reporting requirements and
his specific intent to commit the crime.’”61 In the case of a corporation’s criminal liability, the
court held that “knowledge” could be inferred “if a defendant consciously avoided learning about
the reporting requirements,”62 and the corporation’s knowledge would be established by proof of
such knowledge on the part of “individual employees acting within the scope of their
employment.”63 The employees’ knowledge would be “imputed” to the corporation as the
corporation’s own knowledge.64 Specific intent, similarly, could be shown by proof of “flagrant
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821 F.2d 844 (!st Cir. 1987).
31 U.S.C. sec. 5322.
821 F.2d at 854, quoting U.S. v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F. 2d 1570, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986).
821 F.2d at 855.
Id.
Id.
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indifference” of the corporations toward its legal obligations65 – “a disregard for the governing
statute an an indifference to its requirements.”66
In an earlier criminal antitrust case involving a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,67 the circuit court fully explained the rationale for corporate criminal liability and its proof
through the actions and knowledge of the corporation’s employees, imputed to the principal
decision makers in the corporation.68

Sherman Act violations are commercial offenses. They are usually motivated by
a desire to enhance profits. They commonly involve large, complex, and highly
decentralized corporate business enterprises, and intricate business processes,
practices, and arrangements. More often than not they also involve basic policy
decisions, and must be implemented over an extended period of time.
Complex business structures, characterized by decentralization and
delegation of authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business purposes,
make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents responsible for
Sherman Act violations. At the same time it is generally true that high
management officials, for whose conduct the corporate directors and stockholders
are the most clearly responsible, are likely to have participated in the policy
decisions underlying Sherman Act violations,or at least to have become aware of
them.
Violations of the Sherman Act are a likely consequence of the pressure to
maximize profits that is commonly imposed by corporate owners upon managing
agents and, in turn, upon lesser employees. *** In sum, identification of the
particular agents responsible for a Sherman Act violation is especially difficult,
and their conviction and punishment is peculiarly ineffective as a deterrent.
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Id.
Id. quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127 & n. 20 (1985).
15 U.S.C. sec. 1.
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Circuit 1973).
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For these reasons we conclude that as a general rule a corporation is
[criminally] liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of
their employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express
instructions to the agent.69

These cases illustrate the breadth of potential corporate criminal liability and the factual grounds
on which it can be based or imputed. Our proposal for institutional reckless disregard, however,
would sweep considerably more narrowly, requiring proof that the responsible corporate officer
made a business decision with actual knowledge of its consequences to the company’s news
organizations, for specific profit-seeking and financial market-based reasons, and without
justification in journalistic values.

B. Incitement

69 Id. at 1006-1007.
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If we look to areas outside defamation and corporate criminal liability for guidance on
whether institutional recklessness can fit into the larger first amendment picture, the law of
incitement comes immediately to mind.70 Incitement involves the directness of a causal link
between speech and harm.71 First Amendment protections for inciting speech turn on subjective
state of mind as well as objective measures of harm and immediacy, much like actual malice.72
The clear and present danger test for incitement is the most exacting and speech protective first
amendment test.73 Thus, if our proposed standard of institutional reckless disregard in
defamation cases would satisfy the constitutional demands placed on incitement, the conclusion
would follow that institutional reckless disregard is likewise a constitutionally adequate standard
of liability for defamation.
Brandenburg v. Ohio74 is the paradigm incitement case. Its test, the culmination of fifty
years of judicial crafting by many of the great jurisprudential minds of the 20th Century,75
immunizes advocacy of unlawful acts unless the speech is intended to and likely to produce
specific imminent lawless action. The test breaks down into a set of objective and subjective
elements.
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Brandenburg; Jeffries article Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
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Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
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Id.
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Id.
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395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Justices Warran, Brennan, Marshall, and White were just some of the individuals
involved in creating the incitement standard.
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Objective inquiry focuses principally on the words (or images, etc.) used by the speaker.
Did the speech concern serious illegal acts and was it directed to the production of such acts?
Wss the speech sufficiently specific in the harms advocated to tie the speaker to subsequent
lawless actions? The Supreme Court, in Claiborne Hardware,76 held that even though the Field
Secretary of the National NAACP, Charles Evers, had stated in a speech “if we catch you going
in any of them racists white stores, we're gonna break your ... neck,"77 the NAACP was not liable
for acts of damage done by the ‘enforcers’ of a boycott in Claiborne County, Mississippi.78
The Brandenburg standard is also subjective and contextual. Like the determination of
whether defamatory material is published with “actual malice” – knowing a statement’s falsity at
the time and in the context of its publication – the determination of whether the speech is (a)
intended to produce; and (b) likely to produce; (c) imminent lawless action depends on context.
The classic example is from J.S. Mill’s On Liberty, where Mill defines the difference between
appropriate and inappropriate advocacy in the context of a corn dealer: violence-threatening
denunciation of a merchant on the street-corner is different from delivering the same statement to
an angry, starving mob gathered with torches outside the merchant’s house.79 The focus is on
the immediacy and probability of the risk, and knowledge, indeed specific intention, that it
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N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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Id. at 900.
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Id. at 931.

79

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 56 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge University Press
1989)(1859).
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follow from the speech; if there is time to intervene between the speech and the harm, or if there
is little likelihood of action being taken, the speech does not satisfy the Brandenburg standard.
Both Brandenburg and Sullivan set demanding standards for liability. It has been rare for
courts applying either test to permit liability. Unlike Sullivan, few incitement cases have reached
the Supreme Court since Brandenburg itself.80 Thus, the incitement standard has not
experienced much evolutionary change. Change in incitement doctrine has only been a recent
phenomenon. This also means, however, that there has been little discussion of the precise scope
of the doctrine. Unlike libel, where questions on the edges of the doctrine have reached the high
court on a regular basis,81 the tensions around the boundaries of incitement doctrine have not
been until very recently. This leaves an interesting mix of cases at the Circuit Court of Appeals
level that skirt the edges of Brandenburg. As we look at them, we can see the sources of tension
that have led the circuit courts to seek alternative theories, and possible analogies for institutional
reckless disregard, in the analysis that they used.82 This is a trend that has been confirmed
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See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886;Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
Excluding threat cases these two cases round out the totality of the substantive examples.,
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See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Harte-Hanks Commun.,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
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See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987); Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette,
Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2002).
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recently in the United States Supreme Court’s cross-burning (hate speech and incitement)
decision in Virginia v. Black.83
When we compare incitement cases with ou rinstitutional reckless disregard standard of
awareness of unjustified risk of harm, we will see courts using the same type of analysis to adjust
and refocus the Brandenburg incitement test. In the incitement setting this is accomplished
through subcategorization – the creation of smaller, more specific categories of incitement (racial
versus political threats, for example) which emphasize the altered probability of harm from a
certain type of speech. In the process, the more general Brandenburg standard has been altered
and recast, reflecting the judges’ impression of the difference in characteristics between speech
‘X’ and ‘mere advocacy.’
Watts and ‘True Threats’

One of the earliest boundary markers for the new incitement doctrine was handed down
during the same term as Brandenburg. In Watts v. United States84 the Supreme Court stated,
almost off-handedly, the concept of a ‘true threat,’ a curiously undefined term that has since been
embraced by lower courts as an intuitive limitation on free speech rights. Watts was an antiwar
protester who stated at a rally that were he drafted, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”85 The Court, calling this ‘political hyperbole,’ not a
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538 U.S 343 (2003).
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Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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Id. at 706.
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‘true threat,’ held that Watts was not liable under a statute punishing threats against the
President.86
The true threat doctrine, as it has come to be called, is generally thought of as related to
Brandenburg.87 But it differs quite materially in content and in its lower mens rea requirement.88
The Court’s distinction in Watts between ‘threats’ and ‘hyperbole’ was not based on any
specifically articulated idea, but seems to have been largely intuitive,89 and it was
unaccompanied by any definition of a ‘true threat.’
In the absence of direction from the Supreme Court, however, the circuit courts have
given the term substantive content, though adopting differing definitions of what qualifies as a
‘threat.’90 A common feature of the definition is a lower mens rea requirement, typified by the
Ninth Circuit’s statement that the “only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant
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Id. at 708. While Watts’ words were protected by the First Amendment, the decision
left the statute intact, suggesting that at least in some contexts threatening remarks were beyond
the protection of the First Amendment.
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United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996)(holding that statements made
to an abortion doctor constituted true threats even though the statements never outright
threatened the doctor’s life or safety); United States v. McMillan, 53 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Miss.
1999)(holding that the statement ‘where’s a pipebomber when you need one’ constituted a true
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Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002)(holding that “wanted-type” posters identifying a specific doctor who provided abortions
constituted a true threat).
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intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.”91 There is no requirement that the person
intend to threaten or to carry out a threat, or a particular act of violence toward a known person,
but merely that they intend to say something that would be interpreted as a threat.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in the “Nuremburg Files” case, Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA),92 illustrates this
process of distinguishing and reshaping facts. The ACLA’s “Nurenmburg Files” web site,
among other things, listed the names and addresses of doctors performing abortions, indicating
by various shadings who had already been killed, who had been injured, who had stopped
performing abortions, and in the brightest lettering those who continue to perform abortions
without apparent consequence (so far, by implication).93 In the Planned Parenthood case the 9th
Circuit held the web site to be a ‘threat,’ though the threat was only implied, not expressly stated,
and the content of the “Nuremburg Files” was enjoined under the Free Access to Clinics Act and,
according to the majority, without violation of the First Amendment.
The court was strongly divided, with the majority emphasizing the difference between
intimidation by threat and the general advocacy doctrines. Judge Rymer stated that the case was
a threat case, not an advocacy case,94 by redescribing the characteristics of the speech95 and the
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are not just a political statement.”)
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harm justifying regulation of the speech in a way unfamiliar to the standard Brandenburg
analysis. Under Brandenburg, harm originates from the speech’s effect of producing specific
non-speech harm to third parties. Under the Planned Parenthood analysis, the threat itself – the
fear instilled in third parties by the threat of other harm – is described as a harm. Judge Rymer
then links this logic to the holding in Watts that certain threats constitute a type of speech whose
characteristics overcome the standard presumption against government prohibition of speech.
This logic reconceptualizes the speech, emphasizing certain ‘threatening’ characteristics of the
speech that are themselves harmful (or risky), thus redirecting the focus away from the linkage
between the speech some actual harm produced by the speech. Once the threat itself is seen as a
harm, the Planned Parenthood majority employ a (circular) ‘clear and present danger’-like
analysis without seeming to apply a lower standard than the First Amendment dictates.

Instructional speech

Another offshoot from incitement is a category that can best be described as ‘instructional
speech.’96 In contrast to advocacy or threats, ‘instructional speech’ consists of express
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“Indeed, one finds in Hit Man little, if anything, even remotely characterizable as the
abstract criticism thatBrandenburg jealously protects. Hit Man's detailed, concrete instructions
and adjurations to murder stand in stark contrast to the vague, rhetorical threats of politically or
socially motivated violence that have historically been considered part and parcel of the
impassioned criticism of laws, policies, and government indispensable in a free society and
rightly protected under Brandenburg. … Ideas simply are neither the focus nor the burden of the
book. To the extent that there are any passages within Hit Man's pages that arguably are in the
nature of ideas or abstract advocacy, those sentences are so very few in number and isolated as to
be legally of no significance whatsoever.” Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 262 (4th Cir.
1997).
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instructions on how to carry out illegal activity.97 The standard applied in such cases differs
from the Brandenburg test because there is no required proof that specifically defined and
intended illegal activity will occur immediately.98 The standard is akin to the dicta in an older
set of cases that distinguished certain speech from advocacy, stating that “preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action”99 is not protected speech.
A paradigmatic modern example of instructional speech is Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.100
Paladin Press published “Hit Man,” a book purporting to instruct would-be assassins. Palladin
was sued after one of its readers performed a three-murder contract killing in accordance with
the book’s advice.101 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the book was not fully protected First
Amendment speech, but instead ‘instructional speech’ subject to a different regime than
advocacy.102 Judge Luttig subtly altered the clear and present danger analysis, reconceptualizing
the speech not as incitement but as “aiding and abetting.”103 The speech, thus, was no longer
deemed ‘mere advocacy;’ it was something different and more sinister. There was no longer a
separation between the speech and the subsequent harmful action produced by the speech;
97
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v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997).
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instead, in this conception, the action and speech are conceptually joined as the harm (aiding and
abetting crime), with the harm not a specific subsequent act produced imminently by the speech,
but instead the risk that such an act would occur. There is also an attempt to build the roots of
this analysis out of other ground than Brandenburg, following instead Judge Rymer’s reliance on
Watts in the Planned Parenthood case. Judge Luttig describes his decision as resting on a wider
principle found “in a case [Watts] indistinguishable in principle from that before us.”104

Virginia v. Black105

It has only been recently that the Supreme Court has again spoken on the subjects of
incitement, clear and present danger analysis, and what now appears to be a separate category of
less protected, intrinsically harmful speech, of which cross burning is the paradigm. In Virginia
v. Black the Court recast Brandenburg’s dividing line between threats and advocacy, and created
a new analytical framework through which to assess the constitutionally required relationship
between speech and harm – a framework, it appears, the bears a close resemblance to that
employed in Planned Parenthood and Palladin.106
Virginia v. Black involved the placement of a burning cross, the symbol of the KKK and
of racial violence in the South, about 500 feet back from a well-traveled rural road in Northern
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123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
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Id. at 1549.
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Virginia.107 Persons driving by would be hard pressed not to see the cross. African Americans
who so witnessed it would be, the Court said, struck with fear – intimidated, in the language of
the Virginia statute.108 The cross stood for racial violence, though it did not expressly advocate it
in any way or time or to any specific persons. Like Brandenburg, also a cross-burning case,
application of the traditional clear and present danger test would almost certainly have barred the
State from regulating or prohibiting the burning flag. The causal link between the speech (a
burning cross) and resulting harm – actual racial violence – was simply too vague, unspecific,
and attenuated to satisfy the First Amendment.
But in Black the Supreme Court leapfrogged the Brandenburg analysis by creating a
category of speech in which the “harm” is not a concrete act produced by the expression.
Instead, the Virginia law at issue in Black criminalized intimidation, thus making the speech
itself a harm.109 Intimidation is not a threat backed up by an intent and probability that a harmful
act will be imminently carried out. Intimidation is instead the fear actually felt by those who see
the burning cross and interpret it as a threat – a terrible, though belief-based and non-physical,
risk of harm.110 Under Black, in short, intimidation by words need not cause the harm; it is the
harm. Black thus endorses the trend away from Brandenburg’s requirements of specific intent,
harm produced by speech, and likelihood of specified harm, and toward reconceptualized harm
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Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1547-48 (2003); see also American Booksellers
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
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in categories of cases. As the likelihood (risk) of harm increases, it seems, the level of and
specificity of intent and harm are lowered to compensate.
Virginia v. Black represents the acceptance of the ‘true threat’ doctrine and all that it
implies. The Court baldly states that threats are unprotected speech.111 This statement elevates
threat doctrine to an integral place in First Amendment doctrine. As recently as Claiborne
Hardware, the Court had held that speech that looked much like today’s ‘true threats’ was
instead protected advocacy. But the two concepts of threat and advocacy are largely
irreconcilable; a threat is harm, and advocacy may produce harm, according to the Court, but the
divide between the two is unspecified. Once speech is termed a ‘threat,’ the speech is placed in a
category of speech with a higher risk of harm and, thus, a lower level of scrutiny. This is
precisely what institutional reckless disregard would do, though it would still also require
knowledge of the risk of harm and the absence of journalistic justification.

The relationship between advocacy, instructional speech, and threats

All of the doctrinal tests in the incitement area (advocacy, threats, instructional speech)
are permutations of Holmes’ and Hand’s original work on incitement – a combination of the
elements that went into Masses112 and ‘clear and present danger.’ They use as factors intent, the
nature of the speech, and the context in which the speech is delivered. Because the original tests
were aimed at assessing a wide range of speech, the tests were general and mutable. For
111

Id. at 1548.
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example, it seems clear that Holmes’ Schenck dissent, which provides us with the canonic
phrasings of his ‘clear and present danger’ test, would not have been produced by a case
involving an anarchist randomly distributing instructions on how to build bombs.
The years since Brandenburg have recognized this difference, which is manifested today
in a trend towards subcategorization. The current doctrinal tests subdivide the area into discrete
types of speech, each with its own standard for liability. Each of these areas of content has a
certain level of ‘concreteness.’ Advocacy is the least concrete of these content areas; it involves
ideas and rhetoric, vague and slippery. Brandenburg itself describes the Klan speech at issue as
‘abstract advocacy.’ There is no expression of anything beyond a generalized ill will towards
various groups in society – nothing to indicate the targeting of a particular group at a particular
time.113
In the Watts line of cases, the speech at issue differs from the ‘advocacy’ in Brandenburg
by its concrete nature.114 Threats are concrete; the ill will is directed toward a specific person or
group. To the extent that there is a coherent threat doctrine, it requires that threats be made to
specific targets, and have a concrete and direct message – “You will be harmed.” Threat cases
use an objective intent standard;115 advocacy cases require specific intent. The categories of
speech present different points on a scale contrasting concreteness against requisite mens rea.
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In the instructional speech cases, the speech at issue need not differ in its target audience
from advocacy (i.e., the audience need not be specific). The difference is the content of the
speech: concrete and specific instruction on how to commit a crime. A paradigm example is
United States v. Buttorff,116 a tax evasion case from Iowa. Buttorff was convicted because his
tax protest speeches went beyond mere advocacy when he “explained how to avoid withholding
and [his] speeches and explanations incited several individuals to activity that violated federal
law and had the potential of substantially hindering the administration of the revenue.”117 The
concrete nature of instructions eliminates some of the uncertainty in the causal chain between
speech and harm, making the probability of the speech causing a type of harm greater.
All of these areas of incitement law can trace their pedigree to Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Learned Hand, as they involve a multipart balancing: an assessment of the harm, the
likelihood of the harm, and the intent of the speaker. Brandenburg stakes out the strong version
of this balancing, emphasizing the harm of suppression and requiring that regulations on speech
meet a number of requirements, all of which, if proved, increase the likelihood of concrete harm
resulting from the speech. The new subcategories take a less protective approach, as
demonstrated at the Supreme Court level in Virginia v. Black.118

Incitement and Institutional Reckless Disregard
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The analogy that we can take from incitement is that courts have generally required lower
standards of intent in laws regulating speech perceived to present a higher probability of harm
(though a less specific definition of it).119 Threats and instructional speech, treated as potential
harms justifying regulation without regard to the likelihood of the ultimate act occurring, depart
downward from advocacy’s specific intent standard, decreasing the level of intent necessary for
liability.120 The basis for that change is the change in the content of the speech from abstract to
concrete (although there is a corresponding change in the harm from concrete to abstract –
intimidation, aiding and abetting through speech). There is less uncertainty about the causal
chain between an instruction about how to accomplish an act than with advocacy of that action,
though the form of the harm and its object and timing are perhaps more uncertain with
instructional speech than with advocacy. As the probability of harm from the speech grows, the
standard of intent for liability – its specificity as to harm and object – becomes less stringent.
The judgment underlying the movement away from incitement and the Brandenburg
clear and present danger test appears to be that very risky instructional speech is not speech
deserving of ‘breathing room;’ that the definite and higher risk justify a legal standard that is not
premised on a mistrust of overinclusiveness. Since there is little direct harm from the speech in
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“While the requirement that the consequence be "imminent" is justified with respect
to mere advocacy, the same justification does not necessarily adhere to some speech that
performs a teaching function. As our cases have long identified, the First Amendment does not
prevent restrictions on speech that have "clear support in public danger."” Statement of Justice
Stevens respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari, Stewart v. McCoy, 123 S.Ct.
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Brandenberg-style advocacy, the standard for liability is high. The judgment is that there usually
will be little inadvertent harm proceeding directly from the speaker’s words. There will almost
always be some sort of thought between hearing and acting, which is what the First Amendment
is supposed to foster.
In ‘instructional speech’ and ‘threats,’ however, the requisite intent drops as the
uncertainty in the causal chain diminishes – as the risk of underinclusiveness is reduced by a
greater risk, or inevitability, of harm is found, or as the risk of harm is virtually certain because
the speech itself is seen as the harm. Both the instructional speech and the true threat doctrines
have a different causal ‘look’ than advocacy. In advocacy, there is an attenuated causal link
between the speech and any ultimate harm. The concrete nature of threats and instructional
speech shrinks (or eliminates) that gap, cutting out the indeterminacy between the speech and a
harm. As the attenuation between speech and illegal act lessens, the level of protection from the
First Amendment decreases. Advocacy gets a demanding intent standard; the law demands less
intent in situations involving other (more inherently dangerous) types of speech.
This relationship between causality and intent has parallels in libel doctrine. In
incitement, the mens rea changes with the type of speech: the more concrete the chance of harm
associated with the speech, the lower the bar. Libel does not currently draw lines between
different types of speech within libel, so that distinction is not precisely relevant. In order to
draw an analogy here, we must have some sort of risk continuum. There must be some ‘more to
less’ relationship that we can look at to parallel the change in concreteness found in incitement.
We cannot alter the number of links in the chain, but we can see a similar effect by seeing an
increase in the number of chains. We can draw that parallel in libel by looking at institutional
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malice as action that creates a higher probability of overall harm from an action because of the
number of future events that an institutional practice might cause,121 much like the instructions in
Palladin might be unlikely to produce a specific type of harm in a specific time or place, yet its
repeated publication makes the fact of harm almost inevitable (somehow, someone, sometime,
someplace).122
In malice there is an analogous distinction between individual acts and institutional acts,
and how much risk a certain behavior creates. Single acts by single actors produce little
probability of harm. The world is not repeatedly bombarded with problems if we set the bar high
in those situations by demanding specific intent for liability. However, once we move past
individuals and individual acts, we reach a set of actions with a greater potential impact. As one
moves up the chain in the news organization, risky decisions are increasingly likely to affect a
greater number of stories. An act at the institutional level increasing the error rate does not affect
one story; it affects many.
Institutional recklessness deals with institutional disregard of knowingly risky behavior.
In incitement, redefinition and subcategorization have changed our conceptions of what
constitutes proscribable speech. Similarly, institutional recklessness is a subtype of the reckless
disregard that has always been bundled into actual malice along with intentional malfeasance.
While actual malice and institutional recklessness are both addressed at the same field of speech,
the focus is on different actors in the production of that speech. Institutional recklessness, like
the newer subcategories of incitement, focuses on a category of speech while emphasizing
121
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certain characteristics within that field of speech that make harm more probable, justifying a
different legal standard for liability. By taking that approach, institutional recklessness
encompasses more in the reckless disregard area than the law traditionally has. If the harm that
libel regimes are intended to prevent can be re-conceptualized from defamatory publication to
the risks that a media organization takes when it makes institutional corporate decisions, the field
of inquiry can be broadened beyond the individual actors and focused more on those practices
that can affect a greater range of situations.
The demanding and subjective standards of ‘actual malice’ and “reckless disregard for
the truth” make sense in the context of one reporter, one story. There, actual malice and reckless
disregard require, quite rightly, that the reporter know of, or seriously believe, the falsity of a
particular story in advance of its publication. There can be, and will be, a million little
individualized factors that will affect any one story. Where the factors involved reflect
individualized decisions in a particular context, the law should give reporters breathing room,
lest we create a de facto code of conduct for journalism through the courts.123
However, where the same factors appear again and again as influences, the notion of
stepping back and not pre-judging is less attractive. The rationale behind a broad protection is to
save journalistic flexibility and freedom. If, however, the same practice appears again and again
with a negative outcome, it should not be shrugged off. As the balance of factors that create the
need for the original rule changes, so should the standard.
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Occasionally, courts have seen the types of behavior that might qualify as institutional
recklessness. Without that particular lens, the courts have not always chosen the outcome that
would address the media practices that contributed to the problem. By reexamining these cases,
however, we can see how institutional recklessness might be applied in some of the more famous
libel cases.
The cases of Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts,124 and Associated Press v. Walker,125 are
interesting because the two suits were decided in one opinion, with different results. Because of
this the cases serve neatly as an illustration of the bounds of libel and privilege. In Butts the
Court examined a newspaper story accusing the athletic director of the University of Georgia of
‘throwing’ a game. Wally Butts was, at that time, being considered for a professional coaching
job which he did not receive. He sued successfully, and the Saturday Evening Post appealed.
The Court eventually found against the Saturday Evening Post.126 Justice Harlan listed a number
of factors revealed at trial that could logically have led the jury to find that there was a reckless
lack of regard for the truth of the publication: the writer assigned to the story could have, and
did not, seek more information; the Saturday Evening Post’s knowledge of the potential lack of
veracity of George Burnett, the source of most of the information in the story;127 and a policy of
“sophisticated muckraking” adopted by the Saturday Evening Post.128 Justice Harlan indicated
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his own ambivalence toward the Sullivan actual malice standard,129 noting that different points in
the libel universe argued for rules striking different balances between privacy interests and the
interest in robust discourse. This is precisely the point that we make. While institutional
recklessness is not the same as the standard that Justice Harlan formulated (a test tied to
‘journalistic standards’), it is an alternative way of trying to rebalance the tests.
The D.C. Circuit decision in Tavoulareos v. Piro130 is a close analog to Butts. Indeed, the
Piro court expressly recognized that the fact patterns were very similar. In both cases there was
an editorial policy in place that promoted sensational stories. Both courts indicated that there
was at least some impact from this emphasis on the ultimate newspaper product. While the Piro
court ultimately did not see this as actual malice, it provided an interesting contrast between two
approaches to institutional malfeasance: Justice Harlan’s professional standards approach, and
the demanding actual malice approach.
Between the two poles, Piro131 contains a more in-depth analysis of the impact of
editorial decisions and policies on reporter actions. The majority opinion did not choose to
characterize the Washington Post’s action toward Tavoulareos as actual malice. As there was
ample evidence that the Washington Post knew that its procedures were affecting its reporters’
judgments, Piro stands for the proposition that such behavior usually will not constitute ‘actual
malice.’
129
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The point is reversed in the Piro dissent, which appears much more willing to consider
the newspaper’s general practices as a part of the reckless disregard inquiry.132 The dissent notes
that the Post had already run an editorial about a fabricated story, noting that the ‘holy shit’
atmosphere was a significant contributing factor to the mindset of the reporter. This is not
enough under the typical individualized actual malice test. The dissent instead points to the
Harlan test – “highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards
of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”133 This test is
usually dismissed as ambiguous and less protective than necessary, but the dissent’s conclusion
that the paper knew that it was generating problems and did not move to ‘fix’ them indicates that
an alternative form of recklessness – the knowing creation of a risk of falsity – might be
appropriate in this setting. Institutional pressures had already led to one spectacular instance of
falsity in reporting, a Pulitzer Prize-winning fabrication, as Judge McKinnon noted in dissent.134
The Washington Post had indicated that it was aware that there were institutional pressures to
produce spectacular stories, which could and did lead to false news reports and provided an
incentive to behave badly. Institutional knowledge of the effect that the institution’s policies had
produced, coupled with an apparent lack of reaction to the previous incident, would appear to be
reckless disregard of the risk that encouraging this “holy shit” culture of aggressive reporting
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embodied when not accompanied by scrupulous attention to detail. But in our view it could only
be relevant if coupled with non-journalistic purposes to be served by the risky behavior.

C. Commercial Speech

“Commercial speech” is typically thought to justify more active legislative intervention
and regulation of speech than is possible with non-commercial, often political, and fully
protected speech.135 The overlap in spheres of influence of commercial and noncommercial
speech, and the deviation of commercial speech from the standard justifications for First
Amendment freedoms of speech (individual autonomy and freedom, self-government), bring
commercial speech more substantially within the legislature’s purview.
It also suggests a further development: the same functional/normative infirmities that
push commercial speech into the legislature’s power should also bring it within the judiciary’s
common-law powers. Commercial speech’s First Amendment infirmity is not that it is ‘notspeech.’ It falls within first amendment speech.136 Rather, the argument is that it falls within
those categories of speech that the various branches of government have the power to restrict.
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There may be an argument that it is speech without a speaker, if we view the media
organization and not the author as the speaker in these cases. Certainly it is the organization, and
not the individual, who is inevitably sued. There’s something to work through there- why is a
collective communicative choice sometimes speech and sometimes not?
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If there is some characteristic of commercial speech that renders it ‘less protected’
against legislative regulation, surely that lower level of protection carries over to lawsuits.
Aren’t the two merely two different ways of controlling behavior, one public [governmental] and
the other private [individual]? The legislature would normally be able to regulate speech [as
speech] only under strict scrutiny. Why do we not protect commercial speech from legislative
intrusion? Because although it may meet many of the tests we lay for ‘speech’ under the First
Amendment, it is not the type of speech that the Framers intended to protect and it is not the type
of speech that supports the self-governing and autonomy values that we have come to ascribe to
protected speech in general.137 It may be speech, but it’s not motivated to contribute to the
public dialogue.138 And if it’s not contributing to the public consciousness about what is and is
not important, then it lays outside the protected core of speech freedom. If commercial speech is
less protected from legislative regulation and lawmaking, then it is also less protected from
judicial, common law, lawmaking, including the tort of defamation.

Why is institutional recklessness arguably commercial speech?

What we define as “institutional recklessness” carries with it an implicit statement that
the activities are justified on grounds unrelated to the ends of freedom of speech or press.139 If
institutional recklessness is, as we suggest, the result of speech decisions that are motivated by
purely economic concerns, shouldn’t it be excluded from the realm of public-discourse driven
137
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protections? The only reason we tolerate false fact is that, supposedly, the process that spawned
the false statements was motivated by the intent to engage in public discourse.140 If we remove
that intent, we remove the justification for shielding it with the First Amendment. There is no
constitutional protection for false fact.141 The constitutional protection surrounds the attempt to
engage in public discourse. When that enterprise is left behind, so are the protections of
Sullivan.
Robert Post has rightly criticized the Central Hudson test for protection of commercial
speech because it is abstract and judicially unworkable.142 When he attempts to break it down
into something usable, he proposes a conception of First Amendment (non-commercial) speech
that coincides with personal, democratic-involvement speech and speech that is within the pressas-public- information-institution.143 Institutional recklessness lies within neither of these
categories. It is not a instance of a person individually contributing to the public dialog, and it is
not an instance of a media institution contributing information that will help individuals join in
the public dialogue.
In commercial speech doctrine, and more generally in free speech doctrine as applied to
less protected forms of expression, motivation plays a key role in how speech is categorized and
judged. This is the case with fighting words,144 libel,145 advocacy/incitement,146 commercial
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speech,147 and indecent speech.148 In all of these areas, intent of the speaker plays a significant
definitional role. These types of non-first amendment speech are usually close to First
Amendment speech: it is not the valuable content that the law looks at, but rather the presence or
absence of the contaminating non-speech element of intent or purpose.149 If it is there, the
speech is entitled to reduced first amendment protection.150 That should be the case with
institutional recklessness. If the institution as a whole can be said to be at fault for recklessness,
and the reason for the institution’s action bears no relation to journalistic purposes, the speech at
issue crosses into a less protected and more regulable field of expression.
Post’s account, of course, is not the conventional account of commercial speech. It is in
some respects artificially narrowing of protected speech, but it does provide a coherent and
constitutionally grounded theory explaining why institutional recklessness constitutes a type of
expressive choice yielding false fact that should be more susceptible to liability for resulting
harm, and it ties together two areas of the law that are ultimately related.

D. Product Liability and News Enterprise Liability
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Over the past half-Century tort law has witnessed a profound change from a system that
imposed liability strictly and only151 on the basis of the fault of an individual, toward a system
that now often assigns responsibility at the enterprise level and shifts risks of harm and loss in
recognition of the responsibilities that today’s large and complex corporate organizations must
bear152 Institutional reckless disregard for truth is consistent with this fundamental trend toward
risk distribution and assignment of liability in terms of non-fault-based ideas of social
responsibility. It is a trend most clearly seen, perhaps, in the fields of strict and product liability
for manufacturers and distributors of defective or dangerous products.
To prevail in a product liability case a plaintiff must at least prove two things. First, the
plaintiff’s harm must have resulted from a product defect.153 Second, the product must have
been defective when it left the hands of the defendant.154 Before 1960, a plaintiff also had to
prove that the defendant was negligent either in manufacturing the product or distributing the
product.155 Under current law, however, a plaintiff is not always required to show negligence.
Instead, a strict liability standard is used to determine fault.156 For strict liability to apply a
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plaintiff only needs to show that the product does not conform to the manufacturer’s intended
design.157
This is the basic theory behind products liability.158 Elaborations on this basic theory,
starting with the concept of negligence, also exist. First, a plaintiff who must prove negligence
can do so in various ways. A plaintiff could show that the manufacturer performed inadequate
safety testing on the product.159 A plaintiff could challenge the quality control process, or claim
that an employee executed the quality control process incorrectly.160 Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior the manufacturer will be responsible for the negligence of its employees.161
These examples of negligence apply to a manufacturer of a product. A plaintiff can also
prove that a wholesaler or retailer is negligent and thus liable under a products liability theory.162
The Restatement of Torts Second163 states that at the very least a wholesaler/retailer is required to
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prevent distribution of products they know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know,
are defective.164
But negligence is not always required to be proved. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,165 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 166 the courts eliminated the
requirement that a plaintiff prove negligence. Instead, strict liability was adopted. Strict liability
evolved out of the concept that under the Uniform Sales Act (later the U.C.C.) there was an
implied warranty that accompanied the sale of any good.167 This warranty guaranteed that the
product was reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it would be used. A defective
product could not be used for the purpose it was intended; therefore, the manufacturer violated
its implied warranty.168 Strict liability was believed to “better enhance social utility by reducing
the costs associated with accidents and promote fairness.”169 It does this by satisfying four main
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objectives: “encouraging investment in product safety, discouraging consumption of hazardous
products, reducing transaction costs, and promoting loss spreading.”170
In spite of strict liability, a plaintiff still needs to prove that a defect in the product was a
cause of the plaintiff’s harm and that the product was defective when it left the hands of the
defendant.171 To show that a product was defective when it left the hands of the defendant, the
Restatements would allow a plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence that would support an
inference of a defective product.172 The courts have reasoned that while a seller should not be
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Restatement of Torts, Third: Product Liability, Tentative Draft No. 2 (1995) states:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product
defect, without proof of the specific nature of the defect when:
(a) the incident resulting in the harm was of a kind that ordinarily would occur
only as a result of product defect; and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more probably than not:
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect rather than other possible
causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution.
The Restatement of Torts, Second §402A (1965) states the strict liability standard:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumers, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumers without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection(1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
Comment (I) elaborates on what is meant by unreasonably dangerous. To be unreasonably
dangerous “the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.” However, unreasonably dangerous is no longer a
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liable for all harm resulting from its product, a seller should be liable from all harm resulting
from a defect in a product.173
As stated earlier, not everyone who places a product in the market will be held strictly
liable for product defects. For example, state legislation in 49 states protects sellers of blood
(hospitals, blood banks, etc.) from strict products liability if the blood they are selling is tainted
with HIV or Hepatitis.174 A manufacturer can be immune if a consumer never formed an intent
to buy the product. For example, a woman was harmed when a glass lid shattered on her hand
when she picked it up in the store, but because she had not yet formed the intent to buy the lid,
strict liability did not apply.175 Courts also refuse to extend strict liability to cover financial
lessors.176 Suppliers who provide “pure services” are not accountable under strict liability.177
These include health care providers, architects, attorneys, and engineers.

requirement in some jurisdictions. In California, a plaintiff does not have to prove that the
defective condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. Cronin v. J.B.E.
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There have been some, though comparatively few, instances of product liability suits
brought against publishers for errors in a publication. Perhaps the most relevant case for our
purposes is a Ninth Circuit case, Winter v. G. P. Putnam’s Sons,178 in which the plaintiffs
purchased a book, “The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms,” to help them collect and eat wild
mushrooms. Using the book, the plaintiffs collected and consumed wild mushrooms. They fell
ill and required liver transplants. Putnam neither wrote nor edited the book, but rather acted
solely as the publisher. The Court refused to award damages to the plaintiff.
The Court began its discussion by noting that “the language of products liability law
reflects its focus on tangible items . . .The purposes served by products liability law also are
focused on the tangible world and do not take into consideration the unique characteristics of
ideas and expressions.”179 The court believed that strict liability was not a question of fault, but
rather a determination of how society wants to allocate certain costs that come from the creation
of products in an environment where the consumer cannot always protect herself. Claims based
on ideas and expression should be litigated through copyright, libel, misrepresentation, mistakes,
etc. The Court was concerned that imposing strict liability on publishers would have a chilling
effect on speech. The Winter holding has been adopted in other jurisdictions.180
Yet product liability for publishers, like incitement, has experienced change. Not only is
enterprise liability for highly risky behavior based strictly on stock market and financial concerns
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more akin to commercial speech, and fully consistent with the evolution of ideas of incitement
and harm, but the function of liability in shaping and altering speech – in encouraging or
discouraging incentives within a firm toward better or lesser orders of expression – is perhaps
uniquely important in the case of the modern press institutions. A form of liability that would
encourage more and better expression in the news setting can easily be seen as powerfully
consistent with the purposes of the First Amendment.

V. Conclusion

As I write this, I'm down a city government reporter, under a hiring freeze and a
no overtime edict from above and just found out that one of my newsroom
positions I hoped to fill this year will be a budget casualty rather than an
anticipated big moment. My budget is several percentage points less than it was
when I took over in October '98 and my staff is down three people from that time
as well - even though we reinstituted a Sunday edition in 1999.
Oh, and did I mention I'm supposed to be growing circulation and
readership?

I hope I don't sound whiney. I don't intend to be that way.

However, I am exhausted - without the exhilaration that one gets from a big story
or project - and wonder every day if the grass isn't greener some place else.181

The actual malice rule, we believe, is an essential protection for journalists. It protects
against liability for the honest mistake. It facilitates the “wide open, uninhibited, and robust

181 An anonymous editor of a newspaper owned by a publicly owned newspaper
company, 2004 (on file).
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debate” upon which the First Amendment relies, and the equally robust press upon which
democracy ultimately relies. The actual malice rule does this by disallowing second-guessing by
a court or jury on the accuracy of a particular story, absent proof that the reporter and editor
knew at the time of publication of the specific story that it was false and defamatory in some
particular, or that the reporter or editor actually entertained serious doubts about truth and
nevertheless published the story without taking easily available steps to confirm or corroborate
the known defamatory fact.
But it must also be said that the very premise on which the actual malice rule rests is that
of a functioning press engaged in journalism and its aims of truthful and important and
professionally judged information widely disseminated to a public audience – a press in which
judgments about coverage, editorial process and policy, and organization are made with
journalism and its values in mind. Such policies may be controversial. They may involve
sacrifice of long-embraced editorial processes or journalistic standards in order to preserve a
news organization, or to strengthen it in the long run, or to participate in its constant and
dynamic changes over time.
But what about changes in process or production or organization or incentives in the
newsroom that have nothing to do with journalism and everything to do with the parent
company’s financial interests in the stock market, or the value of options, or the unbroken string
of quarters and years in which revenues and margins have increased? What about decisions
about process and production and incentive and newsroom resources that take no serious account
of journalistic quality (or the consequences of its loss), and that are made with awareness of and
indifference to the sacrifice of truth? Should decisions made about the newsroom in the face of
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known and material increases in the risk of error and indifferently to journalism be protected by
actual malice, an ill-fitting standard that focuses on the particular story and not on its systematic
cause, and that rests on the assumption that the institution to be benefitted by actual malice’s
protective shield is one devoted first and foremost to journalism?
It is our view that actual malice does not fit such “institutional” choices to foster
falsehood by reckless corporate policies or processes. We also believe that the stakes for the
First Amendment are infinitely greater with institutional reckless disregard for the truth, at a
systematic level, than for the occasional falsehood published even with knowledge of its falsity.
The latter may condemn the reporter and editor as sloppy or worse. But if specifically focused
actual malice is all that exists – if errors spawned systematically by policy choices are always
free from liability because the errors cannot by definition be assigned to the writer’s actual
knowledge about truth – then actual malice operates perversely to absolutely immunize and thus
to encourage and reward choices at the corporate level.
It is important to remember what freedom of the press is all about. A free press is, to be
sure, a source of countervailing authority and a means of “checking” government exercises of
power. But its fundamental place is more basic and democratic, as the Peoples’ Charter Union
expressed it years ago in the midst of the fight against the Stamp Tax:

We are told that Englishmen are too ignorant to be entrusted with that franchise
which is now nearly universal in Western Europe; we demand, then, that
ignorance should no longer be compulsory. It is not always easy to know who are
our real friends; but we think we are safe in denouncing as our enemies all those
who desire to perpetuate our ignorance. By the penny stamp not only are we
debarred from the expression of our thoughts and feelings, but it is made
impossible for men of education or of capital to employ themselves in instructing
61

us, as the price of their publication would be enhances by the stamp to an amount
which we cannot pay. A cheap stamped newspaper cannot be a good one. And if
we are asked why we cannot be satisfied with the elegant and polite literature
which may be had cheaply, we reply that we can no longer exist upon the earth
without information on the subjects of politics and political economy.... And we
say to those who are within the pale of the Constitution, “if you cannot give us
this knowledge, at least do not prevent us from seeking it ourselves; to tax the
light of knowledge was ever a crime....”182

Exclusive and across-the-board application of the actual malice test in press cases would
not only protect the reporter and editor of a story from liability; it would also, and more
significantly, immunize all corporate and business decisions in a news organization, including
those that seriously and knowingly damage the journalism practiced in the newsroom. Such an
incentive to compromise journalism and its quality, as long as it is done at wholesale, would be
deeply tragic. It would compromise the very purposes of the First Amendment, in whose name
the organizations are supposed to function.

182 Collet Dobson Collet, History of the Taxes 0n Knowledge: Their Origin and
Repeal, 42-46 (facs. Reprint 1971) (1933).
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